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Abstract:
Dechow, Myers, and Shakespeare (2009, DMS) finds a negative relation between income from
securitization activities and income from non-securitization activities. DMS interprets this
finding as indicating that managers use the flexibility available in fair value accounting rules to
smooth earnings. We clarify the role of fair value in accounting for asset securitizations, discuss
alternative explanations for the evidence presented in DMS, and offer suggestions for future
research. We caution against inferring the desirability of any particular accounting method from
earnings management research.
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In Defense of Fair Value:
Weighing the Evidence on Earnings Management and Asset Securitizations
1.0 Introduction
Dechow, Myers, and Shakespeare (DMS, 2009) studies earnings management associated
with gains from asset securitizations. Asset securitizations provide a potentially powerful setting
in which to study earnings management because accounting for income from asset securitizations
requires the exercise of judgment and discretion.1 In addition, as DMS points out, asset
securitizations are an increasingly important economic activity that is in focus in the current
financial crisis, largely because of the questionable accounting rules that apply to securitizations.
Thus, how to account for asset securitizations is an interesting and timely issue and deserves the
scrutiny of academic research. DMS identifies three research objectives related to studying
income from asset securitizations – to determine whether managers use discretion in estimating
fair value to smooth earnings, to examine the sensitivity of CEO pay to securitization gains, and
to investigate whether boards of directors play a monitoring role in determining the size of gains
from securitizations or the sensitivity of CEO pay to such gains.
Regarding whether managers use asset securitizations to smooth earnings, DMS finds a
negative relation between income from securitization activities and income from nonsecuritization activities. DMS interprets this evidence as indicating that managers use the
discretion afforded by fair value accounting to smooth earnings. Regarding the sensitivity of
CEO pay, DMS finds that CEO pay is equally sensitive to securitization income and nonsecuritization income. DMS interprets this evidence as indicating that compensation committees
treat securitization income as they treat other components of income. Regarding monitoring by
1

We follow DMS and refer to income from asset securitizations as “gains from asset securitizations” and “gain on
sale” accounting. However, not all asset securitizations result in gains. DMS reports that 76% of the study’s
observations are gains, 15% are losses, and 9% have zero income effect.
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directors, DMS finds little evidence that board monitoring affects earnings management or the
sensitivity of CEO pay to securitization gains. We discuss several alternative explanations for
the evidence and offer suggestions for future research. We conclude with a cautionary note
about inferring the desirability of a particular accounting method from evidence of earnings
management.
The objective of DMS is to establish that managers “use the discretion obtained from fair
value accounting rules” to manage income from securitizations. This is an ambitious objective

because it requires not only documenting the presence of earnings management, but also
identifying fair value as the source of that earnings management. This is particularly ambitious
because fair value plays only an indirect role in determining the amount of securitization income.
Documenting earnings management associated with asset securitizations is a contribution in
itself, even without identifying the source. Although DMS’s findings are consistent with
earnings management, the findings do not speak to whether discretion in fair value estimates is
the source of earnings management. Seeking to establish that discretion in fair value estimates is
the source of earnings management and not convincingly doing so limits the impact of the study.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses fair value
accounting in the context of asset securitizations. Section 3 reviews the evidence presented in
DMS and provides alternative interpretations. Section 4 discusses the role of earnings
management research in informing standard setting, and Section 5 concludes.

2.0 Accounting for Securitizations
Fair values can be used for initial measurement or subsequent measurement of financial
statement items, i.e., assets, liabilities, and equity. The phrase “fair value accounting” applies
when fair value is used for initial measurement and subsequent measurement, and changes in the
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fair value amounts are recognized in net income. That is, under fair value accounting, at each
financial statement date the item is remeasured to its fair value at that date. Using fair value only
at initial measurement is not fair value accounting because when a financial statement item is
initially recognized, and hence measured, there typically is a transaction in which fair value is
the same as the item’s cost, i.e., the transaction price. Thus, fair value at initial measurement can
simply be the starting point for historical cost-based subsequent measurement. Much of the
criticism of fair value accounting in the popular press is directed at subsequent measurement at
fair value. It is not directed at the transaction-based initial measurement that applies to asset
securitizations, which is the focus of DMS.
Fair value accounting is not applied to asset securitizations under U.S. GAAP. In fact,
the role of fair value estimates in accounting for asset securitizations is indirect. As DMS notes,
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 140 (SFAS 140; FASB, 2000) requires that the
carrying amount of the total assets securitized is allocated between the portion securitized and
the interest in the assets retained by the securitizer based on the relative fair values of two
portions. The fair value of the portion securitized typically equals the transaction price. The fair
value of the retained interest must be estimated, which is where most of the fair value estimation
discretion comes in. In the vast majority of securitization transactions, the sum of these two
amounts exceeds the carrying amount of the total securitized assets immediately prior to the
transaction, which results in a securitization gain. The gain relates only to the securitized
portion, not to the retained interest. In contrast to DMS’s statement that “…retained cash flows
must be recorded at fair value…” (emphasis in the original), the retained interest is not initially
measured at fair value in the securitizer’s statement of financial position. SFAS 140 requires it
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to be initially measured at an allocated portion of the carrying amount immediately prior to the
transaction.2
The subsequent measurement of the retained interest depends on its nature and the
entity’s choice of accounting method. If the retained interest is in security form, then it will be
classified as held-to-maturity, available-for-sale, or trading in accordance with SFAS 115
(FASB, 1993). Held-to-maturity securities are subsequently measured at historical cost,
available-for-sale securities are subsequently measured at fair value with fair value changes
recognized in other comprehensive income and impairment recognized in net income, and
trading securities are measured at fair value with fair value changes recognized in net income. If
the retained interest is not in security form, it is measured depending on the nature of the asset,
typically at historical cost.3 See Ryan (2008) for a comprehensive discussion of accounting for
asset securitizations. However, how the retained interest is subsequently measured is not
relevant to the determination of securitization income – only initial measurement of the retained
interest affects the securitization gain or loss.
Because the fair value of the retained interest only indirectly affects the magnitude of the
gain, discretion in estimating the fair value provides only a limited opportunity for earnings
management associated with securitization income. The likely greater opportunity for earnings
management stems from the decision to securitize the assets in the first place (Dechow and
Shakespeare, 2009). Ironically, if fair value accounting were applied to the securitized assets,
rather than historical cost-based accounting, the opportunity for earnings management associated
with asset securitizations would be substantially reduced. This is because any unrealized gains

2

SFAS 166 (FASB, 2009) requires retained interests in securitized assets to be measured initially at fair value, but
SFAS 166 was not in effect during DMS’s sample period.
3
For example, Citigroup’s 2004 annual report explains that Citigroup classifies some retained interest as consumer
loans measured at historical cost, some as trading account assets, and some as available for sale investments.
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on the securitized assets would have been recognized in net income as they occurred, rather than
only being recognized when the entity chooses to enter into a securitization transaction that
triggers their recognition. That is, if fair value accounting were used for the securitized assets
prior to the securitization transaction, managers would not be able to increase income by “cherry
picking” those assets when the historical cost-based carrying amount is less than fair value.
DMS seeks to study discretion associated with gains from asset securitizations. There are
three levels of discretion relating to these gains. The first is the firm’s decision whether to
securitize assets and, if so, which assets to securitize. This decision affects the amount of
securitization income because if the securitization transaction qualifies for sale treatment, the
firm recognizes the difference between the value of the portion of the assets sold and the carrying
amount of that portion; if it does not qualify for sale treatment, there is no income effect of the
transaction. Because most securitized assets are measured based on historical cost and not at fair
value, sale treatment enables recognition of previously unrecognized gains or losses. The second
level is the firm’s decision whether to structure the securitization to meet the sale treatment
requirements. This level is closely related to the first, and, as DMS notes, most securitization
transactions are structured to meet the requirements. As a practical matter, most firms that do
not seek to recognize income from the securitization do not engage in securitization transactions.
The third level is determining the amount of the gain or loss.
Even though DMS seems to focus on the third level, because it is the only level affected
by fair value estimates, DMS does not attempt to distinguish this level of discretion from the
others. Thus, from DMS one cannot discern whether the observed earnings management results
from discretion in determining which assets to securitize, if any, or discretion in estimating the
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amount of the gain.4 Both are forms of earnings management, but one is associated with cherry
picking unrecognized gains on assets measured based on historical cost and the other is
associated with using discretion to affect fair value estimates. These are very different sources of
earnings management.

3.0 Reviewing the Evidence and Alternative Explanations
DMS conducts three sets of tests to address the three objectives. The first set tests
whether securitization income is negatively correlated with pre-securitization income, i.e.,
whether securitization income is associated with earnings smoothing. The second set tests
whether CEO pay is equally sensitive to securitization and pre-securitization income. The third
set tests whether characteristics of the board of directors are associated with earnings smoothing
and the sensitivity of CEO pay to securitization income.
3.1 Negative Relation between Securitization Income and Pre-Securitization Income
Recognizing that earnings management requires both opportunity and incentive, DMS
focuses on two settings in which the incentives for earnings management are thought to be
particularly strong. The first setting is when the firm has low pre-securitization income; DMS
predicts that “when pre-securitization earnings are high, managers have less incentive to record
gains and could even prefer to report a loss.” The second setting is when pre-securitization
income is below last year’s pre-securitization income; DMS predicts that managers have
incentive to manage earnings to meet or beat prior year’s earnings.

4

DMS provides some descriptive evidence on the discount rates firms use to estimate the fair value of retained
interest. The fair value of the retained interest is used to allocate the carrying amount of the total securitized assets
between the securitized and retained portions. Investigating these discount rates could provide direct evidence on
the manipulation of the estimates because they are an input to fair value estimation. However, DMS does not
attempt to relate the discount rate to evidence of earnings management, e.g., to the negative correlation between SI
and PSI.
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To test these predictions, DMS estimates the following equations
SI = α + β PSI + γ CONTROLS

(1)

SI = α + β ΔPSI + γ CONTROLS

(2)

where SI is securitization income scaled by prior year book value of equity, PSI is presecuritization income scaled by prior year book value of equity, and CONTROLS is a vector of
control variables that includes: median SI for the firm’s two-digit SIC code and year, adverse
change divided by retained interest, idiosyncratic equity return volatility, disclosed discount rate
used to estimate the fair value of the retained interest, cash flow from operations plus cash flow
from investing less securitization proceeds scaled by book value of equity, and an indicator
variable for whether the firm has more than one segment.
DMS estimates five specifications of equation (1) and in all five finds a strong negative
relation, i.e., significance at the 1% level, between SI and PSI. In contrast, DMS finds a weak
negative relation, i.e., significance at the 10% level, between SI and ΔPSI in three of the five
specifications of equation (2) and no significant relation in two of the five specifications. DMS
interprets these findings as evidence that “managers use the flexibility available in fair value
accounting rules to manage earnings.”
DMS interprets the evidence as indicating that managers manipulate fair value estimates.
But it is not clear that the tests support this inference. The tests provide evidence of a negative
correlation between SI and PSI, which is consistent with earnings smoothing, but do not address
the source of this correlation. We offer two explanations for a negative correlation between SI
and PSI that do not involve the manipulation of fair value estimates – “real” earnings
management and a mechanical relation between SI and PSI.
3.1.1 “Real” Earnings Management
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Non-zero securitization income is not, by itself, evidence that managers use the flexibility
available in fair value accounting rules to manage earnings. First, securitization income can
reflect the firm’s economic income. Just as some firms have a competitive advantage in
manufacturing cars, some firms have a competitive advantage in originating loans or other
financial assets. For example, many mortgage brokers have a competitive advantage in
originating mortgages in a particular locale. This advantage enables them to sell these mortgages
to investors at prices above the broker’s origination cost. In this case, securitization income
captures the securitizing firm’s economic income, e.g., information rents. Second, securitization
income can reflect gains or losses on the securitized assets that were not previously recognized
because the assets were measured using some form of historical cost-based accounting. In this
case, securitization income results from historical cost accounting rules – under which gains and
losses are not recognized until there is a transaction that triggers their recognition, not fair value
accounting rules.
These potential sources of securitization income raise the possibility that firms could
engage in “real” earnings management related to securitization income. By “real” earnings
management we mean that firms enter into transactions that alter current period earnings, but do
not manipulate fair value estimates. This raises the possibility that the findings in DMS could be
explained by firms engaging in “real” earnings management. That is, real earnings management
could result in a negative correlation between SI and PSI absent manipulation of fair value
estimates.
Consider the follow scenario. Assume that Government Motors’ primary business is
selling automobiles, but it also has a consumer finance division. The firm forecasts a negative
shock to income in the current quarter because of a decline in demand for automobiles. The firm
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decides to securitize some of its consumer loans and sell them, thereby lessening the negative
shock to earnings. This will result in a negative correlation between securitization income and
pre-securitization income, which DMS instead attribute to manipulating fair value estimates.
As explained above, the existence of securitization income could arise from two sources.
First, assume Government Motors has a competitive advantage in originating loans. Upon
forecasting a negative shock to income in the current quarter, Government Motors instructs its
sales force to originate more loans. Because of its competitive advantage, securitizing these
loans results in securitization gains, which offset the expected negative shock to earnings, and
results in a negative correlation between securitization income and pre-securitization income.
Second, alternatively assume Government Motors has existing consumer loans whose carrying
amount is less than their market value. Government Motors decides to securitize these loans to
trigger recognition of previously unrecognized gains, which also results in a negative correlation
between securitization income and pre-securitization income. This “cherry picking” of
unrecognized gains is a form of real earnings management because it involved no manipulation
of fair value estimates – or any other accounting amounts. In both cases, the discretion exercised
by management was the decision to engage in a securitization transaction to recognize gains to
offset an expected negative shock to earnings, not the decision to manipulate fair value
estimates.5
3.1.2 Mechanical Relation Between Securitization Income and Pre-Securitization Income

5

The existence of competitive advantage or assets with unrecognized gains is an open empirical question. Dechow
and Shakespeare (2009) finds that 40% of securitizations occur in the last month of the quarter, and, of these, nearly
half occur in the last five days of the quarter. It is not known whether these securitized assets were newly
originated, suggesting an end-of-quarter sales push to recognize gains associated with the firm’s competitive
advantage or with manipulation of accounting estimates, or were existing loans with unrecognized gains, suggesting
last minute cherry picking.
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The findings in DMS also could be explained by the construction of SI and PSI. In
particular, SI and PSI are scaled by prior year book value of equity. DMS motivates this scaling
by stating that “equity is a more meaningful measure of capital than assets [for financial
institutions] because assets under management can be large.” However, assuming that firms
require capital to generate income, scaling by book value of equity, i.e., a proxy for capital, could
result in SI being mechanically negatively related to PSI. The intuition for this possibility is that
if firms require capital to generate income, then the fraction of capital the firm uses for
securitization projects will be one minus the fraction of capital it uses for non-securitization
projects. That is, every dollar allocated to securitization activity is a dollar less allocated to nonsecuritization activity. For example, assume Government Motors has two lines of business. In
the first line of business Government Motors manufactures automobiles, and in the second it
originates and securitizes automobile loans. Management of Government Motors is faced with
allocating capital across these two business lines.
Suppose the income stream of the firm is given by I = r C, where I is income, C is
capital, and r is the firm’s rate of return. Suppose we decompose C into the amount used for
securitizations, Cs, and the amount used for non-securitizations, Cn, and construct the variables SI
and PSI as
SI = SecInc / (Cn + Cs)

and

PSI = PreSecInc / (Cn + Cs)

(3)

where SecInc is unscaled securitization income, given by r Cs, and PreSecInc is unscaled presecuritization income, given by r Cn. Even if the rates of return on securitization and nonsecuritization capital are identical, the slope coefficient in a regression of SI on PSI will be
negative by construction. To see this note that
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SI 

r
C
1 n
Cs

and

P SI 

r
C
1 s
Cn

(4)

Thus, the former increases as the latter decreases, and vice versa. We refer to the potential for a
natural negative correlation between PSI and SI induced by the firm’s capital constraint, i.e., Cn
+ Cs = C, as the “capital effect.”
To assess the potential effect of the capital effect on the correlation between PSI and SI,
we use a simulation. For the simulation, we generate random values of r, Cn, and Cs according to
the following uniform distributions: Cn ~ U[0, 100], Cs ~ U[0, 100], r ~ U[0.05, 0.25]. All
variables and draws are independent.6 We generate values for 300 observations to approximate
the same sample size in DMS and construct SI and PSI using equation (4). We then estimate a
regression of the resulting SI on the resulting PSI. We repeat the process 1,000 times and
examine the empirical distributions of the 1,000 coefficient estimates and t-statistics. We repeat
the same process for the regression of SI on ΔPSI.
Table 1 presents the simulation results. Panel A presents the summary statistics from
estimating the regression of SI on PSI. It reveals that the mean PSI coefficient is reliably
negative (mean β = –0.56). In fact, we find that the entire distribution of β lies below zero. The
mean t-statistic is also reliably negative (mean t(β) = –12.81). Perhaps even more importantly,
the 1st and 99th percentiles of the t(β) distribution are –10.00 and –16.20. Thus, even with
random data, the relation between PSI and SI is significantly negative. Panel B presents
analogous statistics from estimating the regression of SI on PSI. It reveals that the mean PSI

The lower and upper supports of r are based on the 25th and 75th percentiles of the descriptive statistics for return
on equity reported in DMS. Because data on the amount of capital used in securitization and non-securitization
activities are not available, for simplicity we scale Cn and Cs to range from 0 to 100.
6
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coefficient is smaller than the mean PSI coefficient in panel A, but it is also reliably negative
(mean β = –0.07). In fact, panel B reveals that the 1st and 95th percentiles of the β distribution lie
below zero (–0.18 and –0.001, respectively). Similarly, the mean t-statistic is smaller than in
panel A, but again reliably negative (mean t(β) = –2.24). In addition, the 1st and 50th percentiles
of the t(β) distribution are –6.21 and –2.08, which suggests that fifty percent of the time there is a
significant negative relation between SI and ΔPSI in random data. The attenuation of the tstatistic for the coefficient on ΔPSI relative to that for the coefficient on PSI is consistent with
the results reported by DMS. DMS finds t-statistics on PSI’s coefficient that range from –12.42
to –10.80 (see DMS, Table 3 Panel A) and t-statistics on ΔPSI’s coefficient that range from –
1.90 to –1.57 (see DMS, Table 3 Panel B). Collectively, we interpret the simulation evidence as
suggesting that the capital effect can induce a mechanical negative correlation between SI and
PSI and between SI and ΔPSI on the order of the correlations reported in DMS.
3.2 Securitization Income and CEO Pay
Incentives are a necessary condition for earnings management (Schipper, 1989). If
earnings management with regard to securitization gains is so pervasive that it occurs on
average, then the incentives for such activities must be similarly pervasive. It is important for
DMS to document that CEO pay is sensitive to securitization gains because the form of DMS’s
earnings management tests in equations (1) and (2) is based on the prediction that managers have
incentives to inflate earnings using securitizations. To test this prediction, DMS estimates the
following regression:
ln(TotComp) = α + γ1 PSI + γ2 SI + γ3 CONTROLS + ε
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(5)

where TotComp is total compensation and CONTROLS is a vector of control variables that
includes: natural logarithm of total assets, an indicator for whether the firm operates in a
regulated industry, and monthly equity returns for the fiscal year. DMS finds that the
coefficients on PSI and SI are significantly positive and that the coefficients are not significantly
different.7
Finding a significant positive coefficient on SI in equation (5) indicates that, on average,
CEOs appear to be compensated for securitization income. This finding indicates that CEOs
have incentives to increase securitization income. Finding that the coefficients on SI and PSI are
not significantly different indicates that the CEO is compensated in equal amounts for each
dollar of pre-securitization income and securitization income. This finding is consistent with
three interpretations, which depend on one’s priors about efficient contracting and the level of
discretion in SI relative to that in PSI:
1. If one assumes that SI is subject to more discretion than is PSI, then γ1 = γ2 could be
interpreted as indicating that the compensation committee does not understand the level
of discretion involved in securitizations, i.e., SI is subject to more discretion than PSI
and contracts are inefficient.
2. If one assumes that contracting is efficient, then γ1 = γ2 could be interpreted as indicating
that SI and PSI are subject to the same level of discretion, i.e., SI and PSI are subject to
similar discretion and contracts are efficient.
3. If one assumes that contracting is efficient and SI is subject to more discretion than PSI,
then γ1 = γ2 could be interpreted as indicating that it is optimal to reward the CEO for SI
7

Equation (5) does not permit the coefficient on securitization gains to vary with the level of earnings and, as such,
assumes the incentive to report securitization income does not vary with level of non-securitization income. Thus,
equation (5) does not permit tests of DMS’s predictions that as the firm’s securitization income increases there is
“less incentive” to report a gain, and “that firms will have stronger incentives to boost discretionary gains when premanaged earnings fall short of prior year earnings.”
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even though it is discretionary, i.e., SI is subject to more discretion than PSI and
contracts are efficient.
Regardless, the findings inform us only about the incentives of the CEO and not whether fair
value estimates or securitization gains are managed. That is, the findings do not inform us about
the level of discretion in SI.
We are reluctant to believe that contracts are inefficient, i.e., that practitioners “do not
appear to fully understand the application of fair value accounting rules.” Thus, we view the
evidence as consistent with interpretation #2 or #3.8 The evidence indicates that managers have
incentives to increase income from securitizations. However, whether this incentive arises as a
result of the ignorance or intention of the compensation committee is unclear.
3.4 The Role of Governance
If earnings management is not desirable from the perspective of shareholders, then one
can view earnings management as an agency problem in which managers extract rents from
shareholders.9 Taking this view, we would expect to observe that both the outcome of the
manipulation and the incentives for the manipulation vary with the level of corporate
governance. Consistent with this, DMS investigates whether governance plays a role in
mitigating earnings management and the incentives for earnings management. DMS uses four
indicator variables to measure dimensions of governance: (1) whether a financial expert serves
on the audit committee, i.e., board informativeness; (2) whether there is a female on the board,
i.e., board heterogeneity; (3) whether more than 90% of the board are outside directors, i.e.,
8

Distinguishing interpretations #2 and #3 also is confounded by the predictions and findings from the tests relating
to the negative relation between SI and PSI discussed in Section 3.1. In particular, DMS attributes to earnings
management the significant negative correlation between SI and PSI. In equation (5), the coefficient on SI reflects
the relation between ln(TotComp) and the portion of SI that is orthogonal to PSI. If discretion manifests in a
negative correlation between SI and PSI, then γ1 does not reflect discretion in SI. As a result, finding γ1 = γ2 is
consistent with boards placing equal weight on PSI and the unmanaged component of SI.
9
Earnings management is not necessarily undesirable from the perspective of shareholders (e.g., Fan, 2006).
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board independence; and (4) whether more than 50% of the board was elected before the CEO
took office, i.e., board independence.
First, DMS examines whether the negative relations between SI and PSI and between SI
and ΔPSI vary with the level of the firm’s governance. DMS finds that the correlation between
SI and PSI is significantly lower when more than 91% of the board are outsiders and when more
than 50% of the board is elected before the CEO took office, but not so for the remaining two
governance measures. DMS finds that the correlation between SI and ΔPSI is significantly lower
when more than 50% of the board is elected before the CEO took office, but not so for the
remaining three measures. DMS interprets the findings as weak evidence for the prediction that
there is less earnings management in firms with better governance.
Second, DMS examines whether incentives to report securitization gains vary with the
level of governance. To test whether governance affects the incentives to report securitization
gains, DMS estimates equation (5) after partitioning the sample into eight groups based on the
four governance indicator variables. For all eight partitions, DMS finds that the coefficient on SI
is not significantly different from the coefficient on PSI.
Thus, DMS finds only weak evidence that earnings management varies with the level of
governance and no evidence that the incentives to report securitization gains vary with the level
of governance. This is somewhat puzzling because if, as DMS predicts, managers manipulate
fair value estimates to increase earnings, why would a relatively independent and informed board
not curtail this practice? Again, there are three alternative interpretations for these findings, and
the tests in DMS are unable to distinguish among them:
1. Managers manipulate fair value estimates and even informed or independent boards
of directors are ignorant or powerless to stop it.

15

2. Managers manipulate fair value estimates and the board of directors is not ignorant or
powerless, but chooses not to intervene.
3. Managers are not manipulating fair values.
Recall that DMS finds that compensation is equally sensitive to SI and PSI even when the
board is independent and informed. The evidence suggests that informed boards, i.e., those most
likely to understand securitizations, and independent boards, i.e., those that have the greatest
capacity to intervene, do not intervene. Because we are reluctant to assume that contracting is
inefficient, i.e. boards are ignorant, we view the evidence as inconsistent with the first
interpretation. That is, we believe that alternative #2 or #3 is more plausible, i.e., either
managers are not manipulating fair value estimates or, if they are, the board chooses not to
intervene.

4.0 The Relevance of Earnings Management Research for Financial Accounting Standard
Setting
Based on evidence of earnings management, it might be tempting to conclude that using
fair value estimates in accounting is not desirable, i.e. is detrimental to investor welfare.
However, we caution against drawing inferences about the desirability of a particular accounting
method based on evidence of earnings management. Holthausen and Watts (2001) cautions
against making standard-setting conclusions based on associations observed in the data.
Holthausen and Watts (2001) notes that in order to do so, researchers must specify an objective
of standard setting and how knowledge about a specific association observed in the data can help
standard setters achieve that objective. Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (2001) explains how
researchers can infer the objective of standard setting from the FASB’s Conceptual Framework
and how researchers can develop a link between a research design and the objective (see also,
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Barth, 2006). Although Holthausen and Watts (2001) and Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (2001)
focus on the value relevance literature, the same issues apply to the earnings management
literature, the conservatism literature, and other empirical literatures that claim relevance for
standard setting.
Fair value and ‘gain on sale,’ like all accounting amounts, can be manipulated. However,
it would seem premature to suggest that evidence of earnings management associated with a
particular accounting method suggests the method is not desirable. To use the language of
Holthausen and Watts (2002, p. 29), evidence of earnings management or its absence is “not a
sufficient condition for [the desirability of] an accounting standard.” To make a case against a
particular accounting standard it is important to consider not only the costs and benefits of that
standard, but also those of the alternatives.10 Estimating fair value allows for discretion, but
perhaps discretion is welfare improving. Perhaps other measures would be easier to manipulate
– even historical cost-based measures. Perhaps a manager always can find a way to manipulate
accounting amounts. Wherever there is discretion in accounting – which is essentially
everywhere – there is the opportunity for earnings management. If a manager manipulates
accounting amounts, should we blame the accounting or the manager? The relation between
managerial discretion and investor welfare is ambiguous and likely varies by setting. Thus,
accounting standards should not be judged solely based on the level of discretion they permit.

5.0 Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
Dechow, Myers, and Shakespeare (2009, DMS) studies an interesting and timely issue –
discretion in income from asset securitizations. Asset securitizations are an important and
growing economic activity and the accounting for securitizations is controversial and has been
10

With regard to fair value accounting see Laux and Leuz (2009) for further discussion.
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criticized during the current financial crisis. DMS contributes to the asset securitization
literature primarily by providing evidence that managers use asset securitizations to smooth
earnings.
DMS interprets the evidence as indicating that the discretion exercised by managers
relates to estimating fair value. However, more needs to be done before making that inference.
From the tests and evidence in DMS it is not possible to discern whether the observed earnings
management results from discretion in estimating the amount of securitization income, from
discretion in determining which assets to securitize, or from discretion in business decisions.
Each of these could result in earnings smoothing. However, these are very different sources of
earnings management, and only one is associated with using discretion in estimating fair value.
Regardless, we caution against inferring the desirability of any particular accounting method
from earnings management research.
A productive avenue for future research on discretion in the accounting for asset
securitizations would be to investigate directly the role of discretion in fair value estimates.
Doing so would help distinguish the two sources of earnings management that confound the
inference in DMS. For example, Dechow and Shakespeare (2009) finds that firms tend to
securitize assets in the third month of the firm’s fiscal quarter and interprets the evidence as
indicating that managers use asset securitizations to increase quarterly earnings. That study does
not seek to provide evidence on whether managers manipulate fair value estimates to increase
earnings – it focuses solely on securitization volume. However, if, for example, one were to find
that inputs to fair estimates in the third month are significantly different from inputs in other
months, it could be suggestive that managers are manipulating fair value estimates.
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Recent changes in accounting standards might provide a greater opportunity to
investigate the discretion in fair value estimates. For example, SFAS 157 (FASB, 2006) defines
fair value, provides guidance on how to determine it, and requires more extensive disclosures
about fair value than required previously. Perhaps these new disclosures can be used to construct
more direct tests. In addition, SFAS 166 (FASB, 2009) requires retained interests in securitized
assets to be measured initially at fair value. Perhaps this new requirement places greater focus
on estimating the fair value of retained interest than was the case during DMS’s sample period.
Another avenue for future research is to investigate whether securitization income
reflects other forms of earnings management. DMS studies earnings smoothing, which is only
one form of earnings management studied in the earnings management literature. For example,
perhaps securitization income is used to meet analyst forecasts or hit bonus targets.
Accounting for asset securitizations is a potentially powerful setting in which to study
earnings management. DMS is a step in helping us to understand the role of earnings
management in this complex and controversial accounting setting. There is much more to
understand and, thus, much to learn from future research.
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Table 1. Simulation Results
This table reports distribution statistics for the slope coefficient and respective t-statistic from
simulating a regression of securitization income on pre-securitization income. We generate
random values of securitization income (SI) and pre-securitization income (PSI) using the
following formula:
SI = r Cs / (Cn + Cs), PSI = r Cn / (Cn + Cs)
where Cn ~ U[0, 100] , Cs ~ U[0, 100], r ~ U[0.05, 0.25].
We generate independent values for 300 observations and regress SI on PSI. We retain slope
coefficients i.e. β and t-statistic estimates i.e. t(β), and repeat the process 1,000 times. We repeat
the same process for the regression of SI on ΔPSI. This procedure generates a sample of 1,000
coefficients and t-statistics. Panel A presents distribution statistics for the slope coefficient and
t-statistics from regressing SI on PSI. Panel B presents distribution statistics for the slope
coefficient and t-statistics from regressing SI on ΔPSI.
Panel A. Level Specification: SI = α + β PSI + ε
Distribution Percentiles
Parameter
Mean
1
5
10
50
90
–0.56
–0.65
–0.63
–0.61
–0.56
–0.51
β
t(β)
–12.81
–16.20 –15.13 –14.58 –12.74 –11.09

95
99
–0.49 –0.47
–10.68 –10.00

Panel B. Change Specification: SI = α + β ΔPSI + ε
Distribution Percentiles
Parameter
Mean
1
5
10
50
90
–0.07
–0.18
–0.15
–0.13
–0.06
–0.01
β
t(β)
–2.24
–6.21
–4.70
–4.05
–2.08
–0.67

95
–0.001
–0.26
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99
0.01
0.53

